China's Policy on Tibet and the Dalai Lama

There may be people who disagree with this post, but the timeliness of this issue, to me, morally impells me to comment on it.

Above: Nepalese police officers snatch a Tibetan flag from a Tibetan protester demonstrating in front of the U.N. office in Katmandu, Nepal, March 17, 2008. Police used bamboo batons to disperse about 100 Tibetan protesters and Buddhist monks in Katmandu, Monday, arresting around 30 in the latest crackdown on pro-Tibet demonstrations in neighboring Nepal.
(Binod Joshi/AP Photo) Note: I was unable to find any photos from Lhasa itself.

It was March 16 of last year that, Tibetan protests broke out in the capital of Lhasa leading to Chinese troops marching on the capital and resulting in close to 150 deaths.

This year, the anniversary of the uprising passed with eery quietness, as paramilitary and plainclothes police blanketed the Tibetan capital with patrols and checkpoints.

It was also in March, 50 years ago, that an uprising against Chinese rule led to the Dalai Lama's flight into exile in India, bringing with him tens of thousands of his followers.

The general story, we know: the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) government and the Government of Tibet in Exile still disagree over when Tibet became a part of China, and whether the incorporation Tibet into China is legitimate according to international law.

I'm not too knowledgeable on the rationale China had for invading Tibet in 1950, immediately following the ascension of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War in 1949.

But I do believe that China's policy on the Dalai Lama shows remarkable short-sightedness for a government that has thus far shown itself to be highly effective at long term economic planning.

The reason China refuses to accept Tibetan independence is obvious.

While much of the Western world, when they think of China imagine a homogenous “workers” mass of people, composing a highly unified state, the reality is that the PRC is a very diverse country. As early as 1949, there were fifty-six registered and officially recognized nationalities (other than Han Chinese) in China. (see: Norbu, Dawa, “China’s Policy Towards its Minority Nationalities in the Nineties”. China Report. 1991. )

That’s not to say that Chinese policies haven’t attempted to dilute various identities underneath the majority-Han identity, in most countries the majority culture dominates, and in China this is no different.

But the point is this: if they give Tibet independence, many of the other regionally concentrated minorities groups might attempt to gain independence as well. (Particularly the Uyghur ethnic group in the North Western corner of the country).

The Uyghurs (see Uyghur girl above) are Turkic speaking peoples of Islamic faith who live primarily in the Xinjian Autonomous Region in the PRC.

From this perspective, China’s refusal to accept Tibetan independence for fear of losing the territory of the nation-state makes sense.

But their policy of vilifying the Dalai Lama doesn’t.

The Dalai Lama gave a speech on March 10, in Dharamsala (where he is exiled in northern India), in order to “pay tribute to all those who died, were torture and suffered for the cause of Tibet”. While his speech included the usual offers of friendship and conciliation to China with which he usually balances with criticism of its rule, it was unusually angry and pessimistic in tone.

According to the Economist, the speech “reads like the exasperated outpouring of a man despairing of the compromise he himself continues to promote”.

The unusually harsh words reflect his frustration at China’s continued dismissal of Tibetan yearnings for independence, and the bleak outlook for political progress in the region, but also the reality of the situation on the ground in Tibet.

Human Rights Watch last week reported that there were thousands of arbitrary arrests during last year’s unrest and that hundreds of detainees continue to remain unaccounted for.

This month, as I wrote above, anticipating protests during the anniversary season, the Chinese government deployed a massive security presence, foreigners have been excluded from the region, and mobile-telephone networks and websites in Lhasa have become inaccessible.

Yet these precautions show that the Chinese government is fully aware of the extent of Tibetan unhappiness with its rule.

It continues to blame this on the influence of the Dalai Lama itself. It likes to argue that before the Chinese takeover in 1950, Tibet was merely a feudal serfdom. On March 28, the Chinese government in Tibet celebrate “Emancipation from Serfdom day”.

But the Dalai Lama has democratised his government in exile, and unlike many of his followers both in Tibet and in the exiled population, he accepts Chinese rule. Not only does he argue for a “middle way” of genuine autonomy within China, he is also unwavering in his opposition to violence.

In fact, what violent acts that did occur in last years uprising in Lhasa, reflected the frustrations of a new generation of followers who have grown weary of the Dalai Lama’s insistence on non-violence.

So what should this tell us? Would things be better without the Dalai Lama’s influence?

What does China hope?

It seems as though China’s hope is that when the Dalai Lama, who is 73 years-old, eventually passes away, Tibetans will lose both their international figurehead and their internal unity.

My guess is, China hopes to subsequently instill their own, pro-China spiritual leader to replace the Dalai Lama once the current one is gone.

But right now the Dalai Lama is the only one holding things together. He, and not the Chinese government, is the only one capable of keeping the new generation of separatists in check.

If the uprisings last year are any indication, and indeed if history (see: the collapse of Yugoslavia) is any indication, if China waits that long, it may be losing its best and last hope of reconciliation with the Tibetan people that it claims are its own.